This is an interview with Ihor Budihai, an Immigration & Citizenship Lawyer who currently resides in Warsaw. Ihor spoke at great length about the sweeping changes made to Polish immigration law in mid-to-late 2025.
1. The Polish government introduced two rounds of regulations on the employment of foreigners in 2025 – on June 1 and December 1. Can you summarise the build up to the new legislation which came into force on June 1, and indeed what the legislation aimed to address?
“If I had to summarize the 2025 changes in one sentence, it’s this: Poland has moved from a ‘substance-first’ approach to a ‘gatekeeping-first’ approach.
Before June 2025, the migration authorities would often accept an application and then judge its merits during the process. Now, the filter has moved to the very beginning. If you don’t have the right ‘entry title,’ the door doesn’t just stay locked – they won’t even let you stand in the hallway.
An application submitted before 1 June 2025 while staying on, for instance, a Polish national student visa or another Schengen state national visa, in some situations even Schengen visa (Type C visa), or indeed a residence document, allowed “entry” into the residence-and-work procedure.
During the ten or years or so prior to 2025, the system was largely reactive – dealing with labor shortages or humanitarian crises as they appeared. But with the adoption of the ‘Migration Strategy for 2025–2030,’ we are seeing a shift from ‘passive acceptance’ to ‘active selection.’ The changes that kicked in throughout 2025 and are continuing right now in early 2026 – from the strict ‘gatekeeping’ of Article 116 to the total digitalization of procedures – send a clear message: The ‘formality’ of a foreigner’s stay is now just as important as the ‘reason’ for their stay. We are moving away from a paper-based, flexible system toward a rigid, digital, and high-standard framework. Whether you are a high-skilled specialist, or the owner of a business, the margin for error has effectively disappeared.
Under the new Article 116 Act on Foreigners, the authorities are now refusing to even initiate proceedings for temporary residence and work permits in many more cases than before. Specifically, we’re seeing a ‘tightening of the borders’ between different types of stay. For example:
- a national visa issued for a purpose other than the (enumeratively listed, as touristic, visiting, STUDENT, and other visas) purposes for which the legislator allows “entry” into the temporary residence and work procedure (Article 116 point 5);
- a Schengen visa issued by another Schengen State (Article 116 point 7) and a residence permit (residence document) issued by another Schengen State (Article 116 point 8). Previously, a foreigner could often transfer a stay from another Schengen state – like a visa or permit from Germany or Spain – into the Polish system. As of June 2025, that bridge has largely disappeared.
Perhaps the biggest headline from June 2025 was the death of the old informacja starosty – the labor market test (aka, test rynku pracy). But don’t be fooled into thinking it’s a free-for-all. It’s been replaced by a negative list system. Instead of proving no Pole wants the job every single time, the Starosts now maintain a list of occupations where permits will not be issued at all. It’s a much more efficient ‘No’—if the job is on that list, the door is closed before you even apply. It shifts the system from ‘prove you need them’ to ‘we’ve already decided we don’t’.
In summary, the burden of assessment has moved from the stage of the “decision to grant/refuse” to the stage of “gatekeeping” (i.e., the admissibility of initiating the proceedings at all). Second, it is vital to possess the correct residence title when planning the path to legalise work and stay. This particularly concerns persons staying on the basis of visas/permits issued by other Schengen States and for persons attempting to move into the temporary residence and work track from visas that were not issued for purposes considered by Polish law to be “compatible” with that track.”
2. What changes were introduced on December 1, 2025?
“Moving on to December 2025, we saw a bit of a ‘carrot and stick’ situation with the application process.
On the one hand, things look simpler: the application forms for a temporary residence and work permit have been redesigned, and applicants only need two photos instead of four. But there’s a trap here. Because the form has been completely overhauled to match the new Act, submitting an old form is now a fatal error. Failure to respond to a summons to remove any shortcomings may result in the rejection of the application.
Essentially, we have a fundamental redesign of how ‘work without a permit’ functions. This isn’t just a list of exemptions anymore, it’s a conceptual shift.
Two areas stand out:
- Students & Graduates: The ‘student route’ is much tighter. Work is now strictly tied to accredited institutions. The authorities are cracking down on abuse of the system here. If you’re a Szkoła policealna graduate, take note: you now need a document confirming professional qualifications obtained in Poland to work without a permit. There is a transitional period until May 30, 2026, but after that, the Polish government will tighten rules.
- Labor Market Needs and cases exempt from work permits: Cases where foreigners can work without a work permit were precisely specified. For instance, the law is opening up in the field of healthcare. We’re seeing expanded exemptions for pharmacists and physiotherapists to help with labor shortages. Cultural and media work is clarified rather than restricted. Artistic activity is broken down into precise categories – music, stage, choreography, audiovisual production – making enforcement easier and legal certainty higher, especially when compared with the vague rules dating back to 2015.
It’s also worth mentioning that, from 1 December 2025, fees for work permits and declarations on entrusting work to a foreigner quadrupled. For instance, the fee for work permits longer than three months is now 400 zł.
We also saw a major narrowing of the ‘Simplified Procedure’ (Declarations) in December 2025. It’s now strictly limited to citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. The big story here is Georgia. Due to the deteriorating political climate and EU-level tensions, Georgia was removed from this fast-track list. There is a small transitional window for those already in the system. However, for new hires, Georgians now have to go through the much slower process of obtaining a work permit. The justification is explicit. The legislator points to the deterioration of the political situation, changes in bilateral relations, and ongoing EU-level discussions on limiting visa-free travel. In early 2025, the EU suspended visa-free access for Georgian diplomats and civil servants. Poland’s decision clearly follows that broader trend.
Overall, the Polish government is saying: ‘We want you here if you fill a specific need, but you must enter through the correct door.’ The days of ‘arriving first and figuring out the paperwork later’ are effectively over.”
3. Can you speak a little about the changes in Polish immigration law related to the EU Blue Card?
“While some areas of Polish law have become more restrictive, the EU Blue Card has actually gone in the opposite direction. As of June 1, 2025, Poland finally aligned its laws with the new EU Directive 2021/1883. The goal was simple: make Poland a ‘top-tier’ destination for global talent by removing the red tape that used to make the Blue Card feel like a burden.
The biggest game-changer is the shift away from ’employer-binding.’ In the past, your Blue Card was tied to a specific boss and a specific title. If you wanted to change jobs, you had to start a long and painful amendment process.
Under the new rules, the decision no longer lists a specific employer. As long as you stay in a highly skilled role and keep meeting the salary threshold, you can change positions or companies with far more freedom. It’s no longer a ‘work permit’ in the old sense. It’s a ‘career permit.’
We also saw two practical ‘entry’ barriers drop:
- Contract Length: You no longer need a 12-month commitment. The minimum contract duration is now just six months, thus matching the realities of modern project-based work.
- Right to Conduct Business: Blue Card holders are now legally permitted to conduct supplementary business activity in Poland on the same terms as Polish citizens. You can hold your high-level job and run a startup or a consultancy on the side without needing extra permission.
Of course, ‘highly skilled’ comes with a price tag. Because the threshold is tied to 150% of the national average salary, the numbers move every year.
- 2025 Salary Threshold: For 2025 applications, the minimum gross monthly salary was set at PLN 12,272.58.
- 2026 Salary Threshold: For 2026 applications, the minimum gross monthly salary was set at PLN 13,355.34.
Finally, the law now acknowledges that careers aren’t always linear:
- Job Loss Protection: If you’ve had your card for over two years and lose your job, you now have a six-month protection period to find a new one. This is a significant improvement on the old three-month limit, which often felt like a ‘ticking clock’ for families. However, if one has held a Blue Card for less than two years, the protection remains at three months.
- Intra-EU Mobility: The ‘EU’ in Blue Card actually means something now. You can work in other member states for up to 90 days within a 18-day period without needing a separate permit. It treats the EU as a single labor market, which is how most global specialists work anyway. After 12 months in the first member state, they can apply for long-term mobility in another.
In short, the 2025/2026 Blue Card is about long-term stability. It’s harder to get into the system than before, but once you’re in the ‘Blue Card club,’ the rules are finally designed to help you stay and thrive.”
4. Have all of the new laws enacted in June and December 2025 helped to speed up the process of obtaining a work permit?
“The answer requires distinguishing between “legal acceleration” (mechanisms in the Act) and “operational acceleration” (a real shortening of queues in offices).
On the side of legal mechanisms, the legislator introduced prioritisation of application processing: the voivode is to consider, in order, applications from entrepreneurs on a specified list, then “subsequent” applications (for the same employer and foreigner, provided at least the working time and remuneration from the previous permit are maintained), then applications concerning occupations from the shortage list, and only at the end the remaining applications.
In parallel, the Act introduced solutions that do not so much shorten proceedings as reduce the risk of a “legality gap”: if an application for a subsequent work permit was submitted on time and without formal deficiencies (or deficiencies were remedied on time), work on the previous terms is deemed lawful from the day the previous permit expires until the day the decision on the subsequent permit becomes final (excluding periods of suspension at the request of the party).
From the perspective of employers and foreigners, this is a real organisational “relief”, but it is not equivalent to the faster issuance of a decision.
When it comes to digitalisation, the reform effective from 1 June 2025 was presented as aiming at “full digitalisation of procedures related to legalising employment of foreigners”. In practice, an important step is the implementation of acts effective from 1 December 2025, which emphasise the electronic submission of documents and digital reproductions (e.g., the obligation to attach a digital reproduction of all completed pages of the travel document, the rule of attaching documents as electronic files or digital reproductions, and the possibility of requesting originals for inspection). While it sounds quite modern to have to upload digital reproductions of every single page of a passport, it actually increases the ‘formal’ burden. If a scan is blurry or a page is missing, the system might flag it immediately.
Overall, the legislator designed mechanisms that can speed up the handling of selected categories of cases (priorities) and simplify the organisation of employment (continuity of legality). However, the provisions themselves do not create an “automatic shortening” of the time to issue a permit for everyone. The empirical impact on actual processing times depends on the implementation of IT tools, the practice of individual authorities, and the scale of incoming cases – something that cannot be determined solely on the basis of the text of the Act and official communications.”
5. Can you inform my readers about the MOS online PORTAL?
“The largest systemic change designed after 1 June 2025 is the phased digitalisation of residence proceedings, whose formal core is the Act of 21 November 2025 introducing, among other things, a new section “Cases Handling Module” (MOS – Modul Obsługi Spraw) in the Act on Foreigners.
The Act provides that the Head of the Office operates, in the MOS system, a module which enables in particular the electronic submission (using an online service) of applications for residence: temporary, permanent, and EU long-term resident status, together with attachments. It also defines the account model in MOS and the requirement of authentication when creating and accessing an account.
Even though the law is on the books, the digital door doesn’t open until the Minister publishes a specific communiqué in Monitor Polski. They have to give us at least 14 days’ notice. Interestingly, in late December 2025, the Office for Foreigners made it very clear: while the change is coming in 2026, it did not happen on January 1. We are currently in a ‘waiting room’ period where the old and new systems are overlapping.
This means that the reform is “conditional”: even after the act is formally published, the real possibility of submitting applications exclusively electronically depends on the system’s readiness and the publication of the communiqué.
In expert and advisory circulation, the label “MOS 2.0” is also used for this new phase of MOS, i.e., a system that is not merely “supportive” but transactional (online submission of applications), which is also emphasised in advisory publications on the phasing out of “Ukrainian” solutions and moving everyone into one unified, digital pipeline.”
6. Is this the beginning of the end for the ‘emergency’ legal framework for Ukrainian citizens?
“The theme of “phasing out” special solutions for Ukrainian citizens and persons covered by temporary protection became particularly important at the turn of 2025/2026, because the existing extraordinary mechanisms were designed as a response to the mass inflow of refugees. According to the government narrative, these mechanisms require a transition to more uniform, durable frameworks.
On February 19, 2026, the President signed the bill act “phasing out” solutions of the special act on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, coming into force on 5 March 2026.
The description of the bill explicitly indicates the intention:
- to gradually phase out special solutions introduced after the outbreak of war,
- to unify the rules of assistance for persons covered by temporary protection and move to the “general” provisions applicable to foreigners,
- to take into account EU recommendations regarding the granting of temporary protection until 4 March 2027 and the gradual transition to general solutions while maintaining solidarity with persons affected by the war.
From the perspective of the legal system, a Senate legislative opinion describes the parallel operation of the “general” regime (including the Act on Foreigners) and the special regime (the assistance act for Ukrainian citizens) and emphasises that the bill aims at gradually phasing out the domestic, special set of solutions, referring to EU Directive and the Council of the EU guidelines on a coordinated approach to the withdrawal of temporary protection.
Importantly, public debate also included critical voices and institutional remarks – for example, comments presented on the draft by the Polish Ombudsman [Commissioner for Human Rights] in January 2026. This indicates that some solutions designed within the “phasing out” framework may become the subject of interpretative disputes or legislative corrections during parliamentary work. Critics are worried that the ‘phasing out’ might happen too fast or leave vulnerable groups in a legal limbo.
Overall, this ‘phasing out’ is closely aligned with Council of the EU guidelines. The idea is to avoid a ‘legal cliff’ in 2027 where millions of people suddenly lose their status. By starting the transition now, in early 2026, the authorities hope to process people into the standard system in a manageable, coordinated wave rather than a chaotic rush at the final deadline.”
7. Can you summarise everything you’ve spoken about today in a few sentences?
“Whether it’s the Blue Card flexibility, the Article 116 ‘gatekeeping,’ or these new work permit priorities, the message for 2026 is clear: precision matters.
You can no longer ‘fix’ a bad application halfway through. You have to be right the first time.”
Contact Igor: [email protected]